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ABSTRACT
Analogical reasoning is often employed in problem-solving and
metaphor interpretation. This paper submits that, as a default, ana-
logical reasoning addressing these different tasks employs differ-
ent mapping strategies. In problem-solving, it employs analogy-
maximising strategies (like structure mapping, Gentner, D., & Mark-
man, A. B. (1997). Structure mapping in analogy and similarity. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 52, 45–56); in metaphor interpretation, analogy-
minimising strategies (like ATT-Meta, Barnden, J. A. (2015). Open-
ended elaborations in creative metaphor. In T. R. Besold, M. Schor-
lemmer, & A. Smaill (Eds.), Computational creativity research: Towards
creative machines (pp. 217–242). Berlin: Springer). The two strate-
gies interact in analogical reasoningwith conceptualmetaphors. This
interaction leads to predictable fallacies. The paper supports these
hypotheses through case-studies on “mind” metaphors from ordi-
nary discourse, and abstract problem-solving in the philosophy of
mind, respectively. It shows that (1) default metaphorical interpre-
tations for vision- and space-cognition metaphors can be derived
with a variant of the analogy-minimising ATT-Meta approach, (2)
philosophically influential introspective conceptions of themind can
be derived with conceptual metaphors only through an analogy-
maximising strategy, and (3) the interaction of these strategies
leads to hitherto unrecognised fallacies in analogical reasoning with
metaphors. This yields a debunking explanation of introspective
conceptions.
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1. Introduction
Analogical reasoning is an engine of creative thought and language use. Its use in problem-
solvinghas been studied in artificial intelligence (review:Gentner & Forbus, 2011), cognitive
psychology (review: Holyoak, 2012) and the philosophy of science (review: Bartha, 2013);
its use in motivating and interpreting metaphorical expressions is a central tenet of Con-
ceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; extension: Steen, 2011; review:
Gibbs, 2011), has been studied in artificial intelligence (review: Barnden, 2008), and has
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experimental support from cognitive psychology (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner, Imai,
& Boroditsky, 2002).
This paper will put forward and philosophically deploy the new differential processing
hypothesis that analogical reasoning employs different mapping strategies in problem-
solving andmetaphor interpretation, respectively: as a default, our hypothesis claims, ana-
logical reasoning inproblem-solvingemploys analogy-maximisingmapping strategies; as a
default, what analogical reasoning is involved inmetaphor interpretation uses restricted or
analogy-minimisingmapping strategies. That is, when using analogies in problem-solving,
we try to maximise the correlations between source model and target and row back only
where this leads to absurd conclusions; in metaphor interpretation, we try to minimise
those correlations, and add new ones only in rare cases where we otherwise fail to make
sense of people’s talk.
Most computationally implemented models of analogy follow analogy-maximizing
strategies (Hodgetts, Hahn, & Chater, 2009), the best-known models being structure map-
ping theory (SMT) (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) (implemented as Structure
Mapping Engine, Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; Forbus, Ferguson, Lovett, & Gen-
tner, 2016), the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989) and
Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). By con-
trast, there are only three detailed computational models of restrictive mapping and
inference strategies: Barnden’s ATT-Meta (Barnden, 2008, 2015; Lee & Barnden, 2001),
Hobbs’s (1992) andNarayanan’s (1999)models. Theuseof analogy-maximising strategies in
problem-solving is widely assumed. The influential SMT theory has extended this approach
to metaphor interpretation (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Wolff & Gentner, 2011). Here, it com-
petes directly with analogy-minimising approaches. In particular, the ATT-Meta model has
been developed with a view to capturing analogical reasoning in metaphor interpretation,
andhas been supportedby showing that reasoningwith restrictedmappings delivers accu-
rate interpretations for awide rangeof examples (Barnden, 2001; Lee&Barnden, 2001)1 and
can elegantly model linguistic phenomena includingmixing of metaphors (Barnden, 2016)
and the open-endedness of extended metaphors (Barnden, 2015; Lee & Barnden, 2001).
On this basis, the present paper will argue for the differential processing hypothesis
through a case study that simultaneously brings out the importance of distinguishing
between the twomapping strategies, namely, by showing how their interaction in analog-
ical reasoning with metaphors leads to fallacies. Experimental studies from cognitive and
social psychology aswell as communication science suggest such reasoning spontaneously
occurs in problem-solving (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011, 2013, 2015) under conditions
characteristic ofmuch philosophical thought: high level of abstraction (Keefer, Landau, Sul-
livan, &Rothschild, 2014), greater psychological distance (Jia & Smith, 2013), lowconfidence
in own target domain TD understanding (Landau, Keefer, & Rothschild, 2014), and low level
of TD knowledge (Vandeleene et al., 2017). Indeed, various philosophers have suggested
that such reasoning is at the root of philosophically and culturally influential introspec-
tive conceptions of the mind (Fischer, 2011; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Rorty, 1980). We
therefore proceed from a case study on “mind” metaphors in ordinary discourse and on
introspective conceptions of themind.Wewill show that the analogy-minimising approach
can account formetaphorical default interpretations of the ordinary talk,while the analogy-
maximising approach is needed to explain introspective conceptions, as formulated in
abstract philosophical problem-solving.
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We will first explain the restricted mapping strategy of ATT-Meta (Section 2) and illus-
trate how the model works by using it to interpret vision cognition metaphors (Section 3).
Second, wewill develop the artificial intelligence (AI)-based approach further through inte-
gration with key findings from psycholinguistics (Section 4) and show how the resulting
“Minimal Analogy Theory” (MAT) of extended metaphor can account for spatial cognition
metaphors that are the home of “the mind” in ordinary discourse (Section 5). Third, we will
show that the central tenets of the targeted philosophical conceptions of the mind can
be obtained – only – through analogy-maximising reasoning (Section 6), and use these
analyses of ordinary mind-talk and philosophical conceptions, respectively, to expose two
fallacies – one local, one systematic, both frequently made – in the analogical reasoning
with metaphors that underlies the introspective conceptions (Section 7).
Reconstructing different analogy strategies explored by AI research allows us to iden-
tify philosophically relevant fallacies that have not been recognised previously. Crucially,
it allows us to do so in the current (and arguably not contingent) absence of compre-
hensive normative theories of analogical inference (Bartha, 2010, 2013). This will allow us
to contribute to the development of a (cooperative) naturalised “cognitive epistemology”
(Fischer, 2014) that shows us when and where thinkers may (not) go along with heuristic
inferences that strike them as plausible – a key aim of the “Sources Project” emerging from
experimental philosophy (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2016; Weinberg, 2015).
2. Analogies for metaphor: the ATT-Metamodel
As standardly conceived in the overlapping fields of artificial intelligence (review: Gen-
tner & Forbus, 2011) and cognitive psychology (review: Holyoak, 2012), analogical rea-
soning about a target domain (TD) (say, atoms) involves at least three steps: first, a
model or source domain (SD) (e.g. the solar system) is identified, and knowledge about
it is retrieved from memory. Second, model and target are aligned, and elements of the
source model (planets, sun, relations between them: x revolves around y, y attracts x,
etc.) are mapped onto elements of the TD (electrons, nucleus, etc.). This step is gov-
erned by semantic and structural constraints. According to the arguably most influential
analogy-maximising model of analogical inference (SMT), we first correlate SD and TD
elements which are semantically similar (which we believe to share properties or stand
in the same relations), and then prune these correlations and add new ones by enforc-
ing structural constraints including 1-to-1 mapping and parallel connectivity (when map-
ping a relation or property onto another, also map their relata or bearers onto each
other) (Markman, 1997, Gentner & Markman, 2005). Third, the actual inferences are made
throughcopyingwith substitution andgeneration (CWSG) froma (partial) representationof
the SD.
Within the philosophically familiar format of inferences from a set of premises, such
standard analogical (CWSG) inferences are governed by these three rules (Holyoak,
2012). Wherever, the premises invoke a SD element which has been mapped onto a TD
element,
(1) copy the representations of relations and relata attached to the SD element, into a set
of candidate conclusions about the TD.2
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(2) In the candidates, substitute representations of SD relations and relata by representa-
tions of TD elements onto which they are mapped.
(3) If no suchmapping exists, copy the representationof the SDelement (entity or relation)
unchanged into the conclusions (“generation”).
We will consider philosophically pertinent examples below (Section 6).
Conceptual Metaphor Theory assumes that analogical reasoning is involved in ini-
tially motivating the metaphorical extension of whole families of related expressions and
may subsequently be employed in interpreting expressions belonging to such extended
metaphors, especially when speaker/hearers first encounter them. A case in point is the
extended metaphor KNOWING AS SEEING:
It is clear or obscure to me why you did what you did, according to whether or not I manage to
see any reasons for acting that way. I may look for reasons where these are hidden or be blind
to reasons in plain view. An illuminating explanation which throws new light on your action will
let me discern reasons I had previously overlooked, and thus get a fuller picture of these reasons,
where I was previously completely in the dark.
According to standard versions of the theory (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999), pertinent
analogical reasoning employs conceptualmetaphors, that is, comprehensive source–target
mappings which preserve relations and may be recruited for interpreting and reasoning
with metaphors. On a standard account, they map, for example, SD concepts like “visu-
ally clear”, “seeing”, “visually focusing on”, etc., onto TD concepts like “intellectually clear”,
“knowing”, “mentally focusing on”, etc. I will call suchmappingswide conceptualmetaphors
when it is possible to generate them through an analogy-maximisingmapping strategy like
that of SMT (above).
In a seminal paper, Grady (1997) deconstructed such wide conceptual metaphors into
mixtures of more restricted bundles of mappings (“primary metaphors”). The ATT-Meta
model (Barnden, 1997, 2008, 2015; Barnden, Glasbey, Lee, & Wallington, 2002; Lee & Barn-
den, 2001) economises yet further on source–target mappings, and makes the most of a
limited stock of familiar mappings, complemented by even fewer widely applicable map-
pings. For the kind of analogical reasoning potentially involved in interpreting metaphors
like those sampled, the computationally implemented model makes do with “narrow con-
ceptual metaphors” (aka “metaphorical views”) which it systematically unfolds from core
mappings or correspondences like:
(1) S sees X ↔ S knows what X is (cp. “I see your point”).
(2) S looks at X ↔ S thinks about X (cp. “Let’s look at the issue more carefully”).
To derive metaphorical interpretations of utterances, the computational model deploys
mainly core mappings which map relations (rather than properties or objects), lexicalised
by verbs or verb phrases,3 and generally prefers mappings at higher levels of abstraction
to mappings at lower levels. While the model remains silent on the origin of these core
mappings, it is consistent with different explanations of how such mappings come to be
made, andwith the use of different explanations for different coremappings, ranging from
pragmatic strengthening (Traugott, 1989) of stereotypical inferences (which may account,
for example, for core correspondence (1)) to perceptual simulation theory (Barsalou, 2007;
Gibbs, 2006).
CONNECTION SCIENCE 215
Further mappings are built up from and around these cores. Where generic or
domain-neutral functions, properties, or relations qualify relations, etc., that already get
mapped, they are, as a default, carried over by generic mapping adjuncts which apply to
correspondences regardless of the domains they link. The simplest such adjunct deals with
the logical function of negation:
(NEG) IF a relation Rxy [e.g. x looks at y] in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
a relation R*xy [e.g. x thinks about y] in the TD
THEN the relation not-Rxy [e.g. x does not look at y] in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
the relation not-R*xy [e.g. x does not think about y] in the TD.
This adjunct generates a new correspondence for any correspondence it receives as an
input. Similar mapping adjuncts deal with ability and attempts to V-y, inclinations to V-y,
etc. For example,
(ABLE) IF a relation Rxy [e.g. x looks at y] in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
a relation R*xy [e.g. x thinks about y] in the TD
THEN the relation x is-able-to-stand-in-R-to y [e.g. x is able to look at y] in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
the relation x is-able-to-stand-in-R*-to y [e.g. x is able to think about y] in the TD.
Further adjuncts handle equally generic enabling, facilitating, and causal relations
(enabling or causing x to V-y, or facilitating this activity or achievement). For example,
(CAUSE) IF a relation Rxy [e.g. x looks at y] in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
a relation R*xy [e.g. x thinks about y] in the TD
THEN the relation z causes-Rxy [e.g. z causes x to look at y] in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
the relation z causes-R*xy [e.g. z causes x to think about y] in the TD.4
Further generic adjuncts generate correspondences for inferences about the manner in,
and extent to, which something is done or achieved (easily/with difficulty, intentionally/
accidentally, wholly/partly, well/badly, etc.), as well as about temporal attributes (order and
duration of events, intermittence or persistence, rates of change, etc.) and the emotional
and other valence attaching to the property or relation mapped:5
IF a relation Rxy in the SD [e.g. x looks at y]
CORRESPONDS TO
a relation R*xy in the TD [e.g. x thinks about y]
(MAN) THEN for any manner M: M(Rxy) [e.g. x carefully looks at y]
CORRESPONDS TO: M(R*x,y) [e.g. x carefully thinks about y]
(EXT) THEN for any extent E: E(Rxy) [e.g. x sees enough of y]
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CORRESPONDS TO: E(R*xy) [e.g. x knows enough about y]
(T-ATT) THEN for any temporal attribute TA: TA(Rxy) [e.g. x persistently looks at y]
CORRESPONDS TO: TA(R*xy).6 [e.g. x persistently thinks about y]
(VAL) THEN for any moral, emotional, or other valence V: V(Rxy) [e.g. x angrily looks
(“glares”) at y]
CORRESPONDS TO: V(R*xy) [e.g. x angrily thinks about y]
Wherever our SD premises attribute a valence, temporal attribute, extent, or manner to
something that gets mapped into the TD, analogical inferences with these correspon-
dences project them too into the TD. All such projections are defeasible.
Conceptual metaphors that could be obtained through such a minimal analogy strat-
egy, namely by building up from a given core mapping with a restricted range of generic
mapping adjuncts, are what we called “narrow conceptual metaphors”. Thus, the set of
correspondences we can build up to from core correspondences (1) and (2), respectively,
are constitutive of the narrow conceptual metaphors KNOWING AS SEEING and THINKING-
ABOUT AS LOOKING-AT, respectively.
Where initial SD reasoning yields conclusions that employboth conceptswhich aremap-
pable with narrow conceptual metaphors and generic concepts that apply in both SD and
TD, the conceptual metaphors can be complemented by mappings of these generic ele-
ments. Since they obtain in both domains, they get mapped onto themselves as a default,
in mapping governed by semantic similarity (see above; cp. Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1995,
2016). Narrow conceptualmetaphors thus get complementedby generic self-mappings like,
for example,
(U) S uses X ↔ S uses X
Generic mapping adjuncts can then also be applied to these correspondences.
Next, we outline how these restricted mappings can be deployed to derive interpre-
tations for metaphorical expressions that form part of extended metaphors (Section 3).
Then, we will consider how the computationally implemented strategy can contribute to
an empirical account of how (some) metaphors are understood (Section 4).
3. Interpretingmetaphors: applying ATT-Meta
The ATT-Meta approach uses a three-step procedure for interpreting metaphorical expres-
sions in sentences. First, it interprets the expressions literally and makes from the literally
interpreted sentence inferences that deploy general knowledge about the SD. This SD rea-
soningmay involve abstract re-representation of the initial premises. It delivers conclusions
that are mappable from SD to TD with the modest resources we have just reviewed. In
a second step, the expression at issue is treated as metaphorical. In line with fictional-
ist accounts of metaphor (e.g. Walton, 2004), this is cashed in as treating the sentence
and the conclusions derived from it in the first step as a piece of fiction and developing
a “pretence scenario” in which we “pretend”, for example, that a thinker is literally look-
ing at an option or issue (in something like the way in which fairy tales pretend that pots
talk to kettles). Precisely to prevent nonsensical conclusions, these sentences are placed
in a “pretence cocoon” from which only restricted analogical inferences about “reality”
or the intended TD application are allowed. These restricted analogical inferences eschew
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generation, involve only substitution, and make do with the restricted range of mappings
we have just reviewed. Third, subject to contextual constraints, one or more conclusions
of such inferences are then chosen as interpretation that specifies the utterance content.
Especially where prior abstract re-representation was involved, the conclusion of the ana-
logical inference may first be rendered more specific through TD reasoning. The initial SD
and final TD reasoning deploys only knowledge or assumptions that are generally shared,
and generally taken to be so shared.
Let us consider how this approach can be applied to deliver interpretations for vision
cognitionmetaphors that are generally acknowledged as philosophically highly important
but have received only rather little and mostly cursory discussion in the extant conceptual
metaphor literature (Danesi, 1990; Goschler, 2005; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999;
Sweetser, 1991). They still lack a detailed analogical analysis (with ATT-Meta or any other
approach).
For an initial understanding of the subtle ATT-Meta approach, consider how it can
be used to derive metaphorical interpretations for the vision term “clear”.7 First, it
interprets this expression literally, and makes elementary stereotypical inferences. As
the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (MEDAL) explains, “clear” literally
means “easy to see” (sc.: for somebody or other). An elementary SD inference (SI) has it
that:
(SI) When X is literally clear (i.e. easy to see), then
(SC) any [contextually relevant] subject S easily can see X.
An analogical inference then takes us from this SD conclusion (SC) to a TD conclusion
(TC) Any [contextually relevant] subject S easily can get to [sic] know X
To obtain the correspondence for this inference, we first apply the ability-adjunct (ABLE) to
coremapping (1) and then themanner-adjunct (MAN) to the resulting correspondence. This
illustrates how the use of specific adjuncts can subtly influence themeaning of themapped
core expression. By “knowledge”, we ordinarily understand a comparatively stable or per-
sistent state that may result from an intellectual effort or achievement. (ABLE) highlights
the achievement aspect of “seeing”. S is able, manages to see X. It hence has us map “can
see” on the ability to bring off an epistemic achievement: not on “can know” but on “can
get to know”. (MAN) then transfers “easily”, and we obtain:
Any [contextually relevant] subject S easily can see X
↔ Any [contextually relevant] subject S easily can get to know X
This correspondence is used for the analogical inference fromthe conclusion (SC). Together,
the analogical and prior SI makes up a simple inference chain. The final conclusion of this
chained inference, namely (TC), then specifies a metaphorical interpretation of the expres-
sion from which we proceeded, namely, in the initial premise of the SI (“X is clear”). We
thus obtain the default metaphorical interpretation for “X is clear” that is reflected in the
dictionary explanation “manifest to judgment, plain, evident” (Oxford English Dictionary,
OED).
In shifting the correspondence to an epistemic achievement, (ABLE) allows for dif-
ferent closely related achievements, including “can understand”. Applying (MAN) to this
correspondence, instead, has us move from (SC) to
(TC’) Any [contextually relevant] subject S easily can understand X.
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This conclusion captures the closely related interpretation informing another dictionary
explanation: “easy to understand” (MEDAL).
To forcefully bring out how the ATT-Meta approach economises on mappings, while
delivering rich interpretations, consider how we can use it to deliver metaphorical inter-
pretations for the expressions “beyond my ken” and “focus”. The OED explains the (now
rare) literal sense of “ken” as “range of sight or vision”. Standard conceptual metaphor
theory would then posit a mapping from “ken (range of vision)” to “range of knowledge
or understanding”. ATT-Meta, by contrast, proceeds from a SI. When something is beyond
someone’s range of vision, he is typically unable to see it. That is,
(SI) If X is literally beyond the ken of S, then
(SC) S is unable to see X.
An analogical inference then takes us from (SC) to the TD conclusion
(TC) S is unable to understand X.
This analogical inference does not require correlating a further element of the visual
SD (“ken”) with a TD element. Rather, the necessary mapping can be derived from the
core mapping (1) of “seeing” onto “knowing”, by applying the ability-adjunct (ABLE). This
stresses the achievement aspect of “see” and has us correlate the ability to see with the
ability to pull off the achievement of getting to know or understand (cp. above). Applying
(NEG) to the result gives us the correspondence:
S is unable to see X ↔ S is unable to understand X
The TD conclusion (TC) thus obtained provides a default metaphorical interpretation of “X
is beyond the ken of S.”
A richer interpretation can be obtained by taking into account that the present inability
to see has a particular cause. It is not due to blindness or darkness. Rather,
(SI) If X is beyond the ken of S,
(SC) S is unable to see X because S does not see far enough.
To map this richer conclusion, ATT-Meta needs to re-represent it in more abstract terms:
(SC’) S is unable to see X because S does not see to a sufficient extent.
By applying (EXT) to core correspondence (1), we obtain “S sees to a sufficient extent
↔ S knows to a sufficient extent (has enough knowledge). (Since (EXT) does not stress
the achievement aspect of “seeing”, the correlation is with a state of knowledge, rather
than an epistemic achievement.) We then apply (NEG) to the result, and finally (CAUSE)
to the present and previous input, and thus obtain a correspondence that underpins the
analogical inference to
(TC’) S is unable to understand X because S does not know enough.
This conclusion can be rendered more specific by invoking the TD knowledge that the
presently relevant knowledge may be propositional or experiential. The resulting richer
interpretation is articulatedby this dictionary entry: “impossible for someone tounderstand
because they don’t have enough knowledge or experience” (MEDAL).
In the ATT-Meta model, derivations of metaphorical interpretations may proceed from
more than one conclusion of SD reasoning and can involve different core mappings, as in
our next case: “to focus”. With (1) “see” and (2) “look at”, this probably is one of the three
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vision verbs most commonly used metaphorically.8 Conceptual Metaphor Theory would
invoke a further correspondence akin to (1) see↔ know, and (2) look at↔ think about, for
example, “visually focus”↔ “mentally focus”. With the ATT-Meta strategy, we instead spell
out a consequence of the literal interpretation of “S focuses on X”, which MEDAL explains
with the words “if you focus your eyes, you look at something carefully until you can start
to see it clearly”. This articulates an elementary SI which seizes on semantic features of the
verb:
(SI) If S focuses [her eyes] on X,
(i) S looks at X carefully
until
(ii) S sees X well.
By applying the adjunct (MAN) to core mapping (2), we obtain a correspondence
between consequent (i) and “S thinks about X carefully.” Applying the same adjunct to core
mapping (1) yields a correspondence between (ii) and “S knows well what X is.” Indeed,
since the evaluative term “well” highlights the achievement aspect, it invites a correspon-
dencewith “S understandXwell.” The two correspondences for (1) and (2) and the temporal
relation “until” provide input for (T-REL) (see note 6) which takes us from the SD conclusion
to “S thinks carefully about X until S knowswell what X is” – or understands X properly. In its
third and final step, the strategy has us rely on TD knowledge to flesh out the above inter-
pretation of “S focuses on X”, namely, by spelling out various ways in which onemay “think
about” something in soliloquy, debate or writing, to obtain the interpretation: “To carefully
reason about or discuss X, until one understands X properly.” To interpretmetaphorical talk
of “focusing on” something, our approach hence does not add another correspondence to
those for “see” and “look at”, but derives new more specific correspondences from those
core correspondences, with a couple of generic adjuncts that belong to a limited range of
such adjuncts.
4. Towards aMinimal Analogy Theory
So far, we have described a computationally implemented strategy for derivingmetaphor-
ical interpretations, and demonstrated how it can be applied to derive interpretations
for extended metaphors. We will now consider how this ATT-Meta model coheres with
psycholinguistic accounts of language comprehension and how it can contribute to a
theory of how extended metaphors are actually processed and understood, in ordinary
discourse. We will thus build up towards a theory that explains how such metaphorical
expressions are initially processed and understood in actual discourse. This new “MAT”
of extended metaphor explains how rich interpretations of such metaphors are obtained
through minimal use of restricted analogical resources, and their interaction with routine
comprehension processes that are empirically well attested. According toMAT, initial inter-
pretation of such metaphors involves routine stereotypical and predictive inferences, fol-
lowed by restricted analogical inferences (Section 3) and, where necessary, by integration
with antecedent world knowledge (about the TD) and standard pragmatic inference (see
Section 5).
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In psychological reality, the initial SD reasoning envisaged by ATT-Meta typically
involves the sort of largely automatic inference processes that are supported by associative
processing in semantic memory (McRae & Jones, 2013; Neely, 1991) and routinely go
on in language comprehension: semantic and stereotypical inferences triggered by indi-
vidual words or phrases (“stimulus-driven inferences”) (Hare, Jones, Thomson, Kelly, &
McRae, 2009; Harmon-Vukić, Guéraud, Lassonde, & O’Brien, 2009) and “expectation-
driven” predictive inferences from prior text and world knowledge (McKoon, & Ratcliff,
1989; Metusalem et al., 2012). Conclusions or outputs of these initially parallel processes
get subsequently integrated (Giora, 2003; Peleg & Giora, 2011; Peleg, Giora, & Fein,
2004). Where they can contribute to the interpretation, they are retained (Fein, Yeari,
& Giora, 2015; Giora & Fein, 1999); where they interfere, they are effortfully suppressed
(Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996) (“Retention/Suppression Hypothesis”, Giora, Raphaely, Fein,
& Livnat, 2014). Retained conclusions can serve as premises for subsequent analogical
inferences.
Many nouns (Hare et al., 2009; McRae, Hare, Elman, & Ferretti, 2005) and verbs (Fer-
retti, McRae, & Hatherell, 2001; Harmon-Vukić et al., 2009; McRae, Ferretti, & Amyote, 1997)
are associated with stereotypes: sets of features that come to mind first, and are easiest
to process, when we hear those expressions. In psycholinguistics, such associations are
often identified through sentence-completion, listing, andplausibility ranking tasks (McRae
et al., 1997). Their strength is measured through the “cloze probability” or frequency with
which a feature is named in a sentence-completion task like “Elephants are___.” Nouns are
stereotypically associated with themost frequently observed or talked-about properties of
their bearers (elephants are clumsy and large, and have phenomenal memory). Verbs can
be associated with more complex, internally structured stereotypes, aka “generalised sit-
uation schemas” (Rumelhart, 1980), made up of typical features of the relevant events or
actions, agents, and patients (i.e. referents of direct objects) (e.g. “She manipulated Joe. He
is so____” – gullible, naïve, stupid. “Jack was manipulated by Jane. She is so___” – cun-
ning, shrewd, clever.). When competent language users encounter these expressions in
sentences, they automatically infer stereotypically associated attributes and consequences,
in line with the neo-Gricean I-heuristic: “Find interpretations that are stereotypical and
specific!” (Levinson, 2000). Together with semantic inferences, these massively parallel
inferences constitute the bulk of SD reasoning which may preface analogical inferences,
in metaphor interpretation.
In fact, stereotypical inferences facilitatemetaphor interpretation bothwith andwithout
analogical reasoning. They also facilitate attributional metaphor interpretation strategies
(Bortfeld&McGlone, 2001; Searle, 1993),which requirenoanalogical reasoning.Whenhear-
ing “Achilles is a lion”, you will automatically infer that Achilles is strong, ferocious, brave,
and noble. In some contexts (“The zoo calls its giraffe ‘Hugo’ and . . . ”), these stereotypi-
cal conclusions will be used to enrich literal interpretations through pragmatic inferences
that can be immediately cancelled (“but the poor animal has grown weak and miserable
in captivity”). In other contexts (“According to the Iliad . . . ”), one or more of these conclu-
sions will be taken to constitute the interpretation or intended meaning. The contextually
inappropriate literal attribution (of lionhood) is suppressed and replaced by that of one
or more stereotypically associated properties selected as interpretation (e.g. strength and
nobility). The property selection process involved builds on pertinent background knowl-
edge (the Iliad’s Achilles is a human warrior) but is highly sensitive to context (as in the
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following example fromWallington, 2010):
(a) Mary is graceful, but John is an elephant.
(b) Patricia is small, but James is an elephant.
(c) Susan forgets everything, but Paul is an elephant.
The multiplicity of stereotypically associated properties can account for the indetermi-
nacy and context-sensitivity of themetaphorical use of the word. Arguably, in an appropri-
ate context, any property can be selected in this way, if sufficiently strongly stereotypically
associated with the metaphorically used word.9
Also predictive inferences can support metaphor interpretation with and without ana-
logical inference.When reading that an elephant or a bull is in a China shop, readerswill not
only infer that the animal is clumsy and bulky, and that the place is full of fragile objects,
but also predict that the animal is liable to break many fragile things. We exploit this infer-
ence for metaphorical extension when we talk of someone being “a bull” (in English) or
“elephant” (in French, German, or Italian) “in a China shop”. Depending upon context, the
inferred attribute (X is liable to break many fragile things) may be applied literally (“Amidst
the delicate furniture . . . ”) (attributionalmetaphor). In other contexts (“During the difficult
negotiation . . . ”), the inferred SD conclusionmerely provides the basis for analogical infer-
ence that delivers the intended interpretation (analogical metaphor) (Bortfeld & McGlone,
2001).
The MAT accordingly takes the kind of analogical inferences specified by ATT-Meta to
be involved only in the latter case10 – and only where the metaphorical uses at issue are
comparatively new to the hearer. According to the influentialCareer ofMetaphorHypothesis
(Bowdle&Gentner, 2005),metaphorical uses of expressionsprompt adistinctive interpreta-
tion process only when they are new to language users, and get processed like literal uses,
once they have become familiar and contributed to building up a new category. Accord-
ing to the empirically well-supported Graded Salience Hypothesis (Fein et al., 2015; Giora,
2003), semantic and stereotypical features associated with frequent and familiar uses of an
expression get initially activated upon encounter of the expression, regardless of context
– and of whether the use at issue is literal or figurative. These features jointly form gen-
eralised situation schemas (Rumelhart, 1980). Repeated analogical inferences can build up
such a schema which will subsequently be directly activated by the verbal stimulus (with-
out “analogical detour”) and deployed for categorisation judgments (Tversky & Kahneman,
1983) in the sameway as other schemas (Bowdle &Gentner, 2005). Accordingly, initial com-
prehension inferences will be followed by analogical inferences only when language users
encounter metaphorical uses of expressions that have not yet become familiar to them.
ATT-Meta specifies, and MAT invokes, an analogy strategy which builds up from a few
familiar coremappings,withwidely applicable genericmapping adjuncts. Inferences in line
with this strategy are particularly well suited to explain the wholesale metaphorical exten-
sion of entire families of related expressions frommore concrete tomore abstract domains
(e.g. the systematic recruitment of visual terms for talk about intellectual activities and
achievements) and their ready extension through apparently unrelated terms (e.g. “bury”
for visual metaphors: When S buries X, she makes it impossible for people to see/know X,
and prevents people from looking at/thinking about X). We will use MAT to explain the
interpretation of extended metaphors.
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The extended metaphors we are interested in are all linguistically realised through
metaphorical usesof entire families of relatedexpressions,whichhavebecomeconvention-
alised to the point of finding entry into dictionaries. In contrast with stereotype-based attri-
butional metaphors which often are highly sensitive to context (above), these expressions
have defaultmetaphorical interpretations: interpretationswhich language users predictably
give expressions, as andwhen they initially encounter theirmetaphorical use; these default
interpretations are modified or dropped only in the light of further contextual information
or social feedback.11 In the absence of such modification, repeated analogical inference
will build up a new category (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) or, more specifically, a new gener-
alised situation schema (Rumelhart, 1980), whichwill subsequently be directly activated by
the verbal stimulus. This schema need not be associated with another expression, or may
be associated with its use in only one of several senses.12 In either case, the specification
of the metaphorical interpretation will require more than a one-word paraphrase. These
potentially rich interpretations will be implicitly presupposed in fast-paced conversation.
In unhurried contexts of “metaphor appreciation” (Gerrig & Healy, 1983) where competent
language users judge the aptness of metaphorical expressions, these interpretations are
not only made explicit but can also be developed further, in predictable ways. MAT seeks,
first, to specify thepotentially richandcomplexdefault interpretationspresupposed inordi-
nary discourse, second, to explain how they are initially obtained and, third, to predict how
they will be developed further.
Wewill now focus on the first task. Defaultmetaphoricalmeanings stand a better chance
ofwidespread conventionalisation than interpretations that require specific andhistorically
contingent real-world knowledge (cp. Traugott & Dasher, 2005). They aremade explicit, for
example, when language teachers and students explain their understanding of metaphor-
ical expressions (Bortfeld, 1998) – and by “advanced” dictionaries. If we assume that most
of the expressions belonging to extended vision cognition and space cognitionmetaphors
have kept their default meanings through conventionalisation, we should therefore expect
their dictionary explanations to reflect rich default interpretations that cannot be captured
by a single concept but can be derived by MAT. I therefore propose to test this variant of
ATT-Meta by verifying that it can generate the interpretations given in the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED) orMacmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (MEDAL), whichever
gives a richer explanation.13
5. Metaphorical minds
Talk of “minds” in ordinary discourse revolves around (though it is not limited to) spatial
cognition metaphors. We will now verify that the MAT outlined delivers accurate inter-
pretations for such ordinary mind-talk, when working in conjunction with well-attested
languageprocesses likepragmatic strengthening (Levinson, 1983; Traugott, 1989). Thiswill,
first, support the hypothesis that what analogical reasoning is employed in interpreting
this pre-philosophical talk uses an analogy-minimising mapping strategy. Second, it will
reveal a surprising fact about the place of “minds” in the analogical reasoning that under-
pins pre-philosophical metaphorical talk. This finding will provide the basis for exposing
(in Section 7) a specific fallacy in philosophical reasoning about the mind (reconstructed in
Section 6).
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Conceptual metaphor theorists quite unanimously regard the use of English “mind”-
idioms as motivated by a conceptual metaphor that treat minds as TD entities and cor-
relates them with containers in the SD (MIND AS CONTAINER) (e.g. Gibbs & O’Brien, 1990;
Koivisto-Alanko & Tissari, 2006; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). We will now
explore a rather different new approach which maps a spatial relation, rather than a spa-
tial entity (like a container), andmaps it onto a cognitive relation, rather than any TD entity
(“mind”, or some such).
Muchmetaphorical “mind”-talk is grounded in the pretence or fiction that every thinker
has a personal physical space or container. But this space or container does not get placed
into correspondence with anything we could conceptualise as an element of the intellec-
tual TD – say, with our “rational or intellectual powers” (as the OED explains another use of
“the mind”). Indeed, in metaphorical “mind”-talk about what people think of or remember,
the fictitious space or container does not get placed into correspondence with anything. In
the expressions of interest, “the mind” rather serves as label for the fictitious space (rather
than any TD correlate) a relation to which gets mapped onto a cognitive relation, by core
mapping(I):
X is inside a physical space belonging to S (“inside the mind of S”) ↔ S thinks of X.
ATT-Meta theorists have stressed that the SD reasoning involved in metaphor interpreta-
tion often involves elements that do not get mapped onto the TD (e.g. Barnden, 2015). The
physical space figuring in (I) is a case in point. Neither (I) nor any correspondence MAT
generates from it places this space (“mind”) into correspondence with anything; rather,
the spatial relation “X is in the mind-space of S” gets correlated with something, namely,
with the cognitive relation “S thinks of X.” Genericmapping adjuncts generate furthermap-
pings from this core mapping (I). Together, these mapping are constitutive of the narrow
conceptual metaphor BEING THOUGHT OF AS BEING IN A PERSONAL SPACE.14
We will now see how this restricted mapping allows us to derive interpretations for
ordinary talk that combines “to/from/in/ the mind” with verbs including “spring”, “come”,
“cross”, “bring”, “call”, “bear”, “keep”, “have”, “put in/out”, and “banish”. For all these com-
plex expressions, we can derive default metaphorical interpretations in line with MAT:
by prefacing such restricted analogical inferences with the most elementary SIs which
merely make explicit semantic or stereotypical implications of the verbs employed along-
side “themind”, and – sometimes – developing initial TD conclusion further, with standard
pragmatic inferences.
As first example, consider “X springs to S’s mind.” To derive its default interpretation,
we first interpret the phrase as being literally about entry into a physical space, and bring
out some implications. The verb “spring” implies a certain suddenness and that the out-
come results from action of the agent-role filler, rather than the patient-role filler (here:
X, not S):
(SI) When X springs into S’s space (mind),
i. X suddenly is in the space of S, without an effort on the part of S
and previously
ii. X was not in the space of S
Toobtain amapping for analogical inference from (i), we startwithmapping (I) and apply
to it the mapping adjuncts (T-ATT) and (MAN), which carry over “suddenly” and “without
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effort”, respectively. This secures correspondence of (i) with “S thinks of X suddenly and
effortlessly.” For inference from (ii), we apply the mapping adjuncts (NEG) and (T-ATT) to
(I) and thus get the correspondence between (ii) and “S did not think of X.”15 These two
correspondences for (i) and (ii) and the temporal order-relation “previously” provide input
for (T-REL) (Fn.6), that correlates the entire consequent of (SI) with “S suddenly and effort-
lessly thinks of X, and previously did not think of X.” As our dictionaries put it, “to spring to
mind” is “to occur immediately to a person, be one’s first or instinctive thought” (OED); “you
suddenly start to think about it” (MEDAL).
The core correspondence (I) is no more precise than our use of the verb “to think of”.
We use it not only to speak of occurrent thought but also when we think of somebody or
something continually, rather than continuously, or even just very occasionally.16 It often
gets disambiguated by implications of the verbs used in the metaphorical expressions at
issue: for example, “spring” implies such suddenness that we can only delineate the point
of change with sufficient precision in case the thought at issue is occurrent.
The expression “come tomind” is used almost interchangeably (so thatMEDAL gives the
same explanation for both). However’ “come” lacks the implication of suddenness and does
not make the effortlessness on the part of S so salient. Hence:
(SI) When X comes into the space (mind) of S,
i. X is in the space of S
and previously
ii. X was not in the space of S
Analogical inference from (i) requires only mapping (I), while inference from (ii) is as
before, to yield with (T-REL) the interpretation: “S thinks of X after not thinking of X pre-
viously”, that is, “S starts to think of X.” Again, the point of change can only be delineated in
case the thought at issue is occurrent.17
TheOED, however, offers a richer interpretation: “to occur (esp. upon reflection)”.We can
explain the enrichment (“upon reflection”) by pragmatic considerations (Levinson, 1983):
“come” does not imply suddenness, and makes the agency of the subject-role filler less
salient. Since the more informative expression “spring to mind” is available, and the less
informative “come to mind” is no briefer, we infer from preference of “come” over “spring”
that the implications not shared (or not shared to the sameextent) by “come” are notmeant
to apply: S starts to think of X, but does so neither suddenly nor effortlessly. That is, S starts
to think of X upon effortful reflection, though the immediate trigger is still no action of S (as
in a conscious logical derivation of X): “X occurs to S upon reflection.”
Straightforward reasoning applies to “X crosses themindof S.”WhenX crosses a physical
space, it is currently in it, typically was previously outside it, andwill again leave it. Typically,
a space “crossed” is small by comparison to the entire trajectory of X. Therefore X will be in
thepersonal spaceof Sonly for a comparatively short time.Mapping (I) and (T-ATT) facilitate
inference from the conclusion of SD reasoning “X briefly is in the space belonging to S” to
“S briefly thinks of X” (as theOED puts it: “(of a thought) occurring to one, esp. transiently”).
Again, the temporal attribute enforces an occurrent reading of “think of”.
When someone “brings” something to a location, he causes it to be there (which
may but need not have been his aim), and there is the implication that it was not
there before:
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(SI) When X brings Y to the space (mind) of S
i. X causes Y to be in the space of S
and before then
ii. Y was not in the space of S
Applying the (CAUSE) adjunct to Mapping (I) provides the mapping for analogical infer-
ence from (i) to “X causes S to think of Y.” Derivation of “and S did not think of Y before”
then follows as above, to yield: “X causes S to think of something Y which he did not think
of before” (OED: “to cause one to remember someone or something”) as interpretation of
“X brings Y to S’s mind.” We can also cause a person to be at a location she wasn’t at before,
by calling her to it. Parallel reasoning leads to the same interpretation for “X calls Y to S’s
mind.”
Similar reasoning lets us interpret talk of “putting things out of one’s mind”:
(SI) When S puts X out of the space (mind) of S
i. S deliberately causes X not to be in the space of S
and before then
ii. X was in the space of S
To obtain the mapping required for inference from (i), we apply first (NEG) to mapping
(I) and then (CAUSE) to the resulting mapping, while (MAN) carries over “deliberately”, so
that we obtain: “S deliberately causes S not to think of X.” Further derivation from (ii) and
the temporal relation is by now obvious. The TD conclusion (“S has been thinking of X but
deliberately caused herself not to think of X”) can be paraphrased succinctly: S deliberately
“forgets about somebody or something, even if only for a short time” (MEDAL).
Talk of “banishment” (as in “The news of her pregnancy banished all other thoughts from
her mind”) has even richer implications:
(SI) When somebody or something X banishes Y from the space (mind) of S
i. Y previously was in the space of S
ii. X deliberately causes Y not to be in the space of S
iii. X will prevent Y from being in S’s space again (in the foreseeable future).
A mapping for inference from the genuinely new element (iii) is obtained by applying a
prevent adjunct that works like (CAUSE) to core mapping (I), and (T-ATT) to the result, to
obtain: “X will prevent S from thinking of Y again (in the foreseeable future)” – and not only
for a short time.
The interpretation of “keep” and “bear inmind” then illustrates the combined use of core
mappings and generic self-mappings (Section 2). According to the OED, to “keep” literally
means to “store in a regular place”, namely, “for future use”. (“To store” is explained as “keep
for future use.”) That S keeps X for future use (defeasibly) implies that S can make use of X
and will make use of X, as and when required. (Why else bother to store it?)
(SI) When S keeps X in the space (mind) belonging to S,
i. X is in the space of S
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ii. S can use X
iii. S will use X, as and when required.
Analogical inference withmapping I from (i) yields “S thinks of X.” (ii) and (iii) employ the
generic use-relation, in which users can stand not only to physical goods but to any (other)
object of thought as well. These denizens of both SD and TD are mapped by the generic
self-mapping (U). Application of (ABLE) to it provides a self-mapping for (ii). Two-fold appli-
cation to (U) of (T-ATT), for future tense and temporal qualifier, yields a self-mapping for (iii).
Together, these mappings license analogical inferences that take us out of the pretence
cocoon and to conclusions about the TD: “S thinks of X, can use X, and will use X, as and
when required.” This conclusion is rendered more precise by taking into account contex-
tual information, in pragmatic inference. (ii) and (iii) are incomplete: used for what? As and
when required for what? Relevant contextual information is provided by (i). We are talking
about thinking. The use at issue is hence the use in thinking, that is, taking X into account.
Pragmatic inference in line with Grice’s maxim of quantity takes us from (ii) and (iii) to the
conclusion that S is not currently using X in his thinking and, therefore, the interpretation
of “thinks of” as “thinks of every now and then” (rather than “has the occurrent thought”).
The resulting interpretation is consistent with the dictionary explanations “to remember,
not forget, take into account”18 and “to remember something, especially something that
will be important in the future” (MEDAL).
The most salient sense in which you can literally “bear”, that is, “carry” something in a
space belonging to you is to carry it in the enclosed space of a container. When you carry
something around with you in a container, you can typically take it out and use it, as and
when required. Indeed, if you bother to carry it around, you typically will use it, as and
when required. Accordingly, parallel reasoning leads from “S bears X in mind” to the same
conclusions as above, which can then be deployed as explained.
By contrast, that you “have” something in your personal space implies only that (i) it is
in the place and (ii) you can make use of it; but the phrase lacks the salient implication (iii)
of storage for future use which is carried by “keep” and “bear” and suggests there is no
current use. As in the case of “come” vs. “spring tomind” (above), pragmatic considerations
can therefore enrich the interpretation of the less informative “have inmind”. Its preference
over the otherwise more informative “keep” and “bear in mind” warrants the pragmatic
inference that the speakermeans to rule out the suggestion that there is no current use, and
seeks to convey the opposite. She wants to convey that S is not only thinking of S but cur-
rentlymaking use of it in her thinking. This is consistent with the dictionary explanations of
“to have inmind” as “to think of, contemplate”19 and “to recall and take into consideration,
keep one’s attention fixed upon” (OED).
Reconstructing the derivation of default metaphorical interpretations for these expres-
sions puts us into a position to clarify the status of “the mind” in the analogical reasoning
reconstructed. In the conceptual metaphor literature (e.g. Gibbs & O’Brien, 1990; Koivisto-
Alanko & Tissari, 2006; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999), it is unanimously
assigned as an element to the TD of spatial cognition metaphors. This is understandable.
In ordinary discourse, we often use “the mind” to refer to an element of the intellectual TD,
namely, to the faculty of reasoning and understanding (OED sense 21: “a person’s cognitive,
rational, or intellectual powers; the intellect”) which one may possess to various degrees
(“have a fine mind”) or – sadly – “lose”. It is also usedmetonymically to refer to people who
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Table 1. Spatial cognition metaphors in German with English
translation.
in den Sinn kommen come to mind
durch den Sinn fahren cross (through) the mind
durch den Kopf gehen go through the mind/head
im Gedächtnis behalten keep in mind
in Erinnerung rufen call to mind
sich aus dem Kopf schlagen put (literally: hit) out of one’s mind
aus dem Gedächtnis verbannen banish from the mind
possess this faculty (“two greatmindswere in attendance”) (OED sense 21: “(bymetonymy):
a person of intellectual prowess”). But in interpreting the presentmetaphorical expressions
in the way outlined, “the mind” is used exclusively to refer to an element of the spatial SD,
namely, to the physical space assigned to the subject S, by the fiction or pretence scenario
fromwhich we are making analogical inferences.
For consider: The derivation process outlined delivers metaphorical interpretations for
the expressions that are used in the initial premises of SD reasoning (SI), for example, “If S
focuses on X . . . ” (Section 3). These expressions are taken literally in this reasoning. In the
case of expressions that combine physical action verbs like “cross” or “spring”, “bring” or
“put”, “bear” or “keep”, with potentially spatial prepositions like “to”, “in”, of “from, and the
noun “mind”, this initial literal interpretation of the verb enforces spatial interpretation of
the preposition and has us take the noun to refer to some physical space, in initial SIs. That
is, in SD reasoning, “the mind” stands for a physical space, an element of the spatial SD or
pretence scenario. In subsequent analogical reasoning, this element does not get mapped.
It is neither placed in correspondence with the reasoning faculty that “the mind” refers to
in the above-mentioned literal use, nor with any other element of the TD of cognition. Only
a spatial relation to this unmapped SD element gets mapped (by I). If one wanted to assign
“the mind” that is invoked by spatial cognitionmetaphors to one of the domains used in the
analogical reasoning involved in interpreting them, we would have to assign it – against
the majority opinion – not to the target but the SD.
To sum up, the noun “mind” has an independent literal application in the TD of cogni-
tion. But, in metaphorical talk, it is recruited to stand for the physical space the pretence
scenario of spatial cognition metaphors assigns to thinkers. As cross-linguistic comparison
reveals, this is an illustrationof amoregeneral strategy. InGerman, threedifferent cognition
terms, namely, “Sinn” (sense), “Gedächtnis”, and “Erinnerung” (both: memory), along with
“Kopf” (head, typically regarded as bodily seat of our reasoning powers) are recruited to
stand for that unmapped space in thepretence scenario (SD) of spatial cognitionmetaphors
interpretable through exactly parallel derivations (Table 1).
6. Introspective minds
Introspective conceptions of the mind, as articulated in early modern philosophy and
culturally influential to this day, are frequently regarded as intuitive and part of com-
mon sense. Various philosophers have suggested that the intuitions at the root of these
conceptions result from spontaneous analogical inferences with linguistically realised con-
ceptual metaphors, crucially including spatial and vision cognition metaphors (Fischer,
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2011, 2014; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Rorty, 1980; cp. Wittgenstein, 1933/2005). With-
out addressing philosophical examples, recent experimental studies from cognitive and
social psychology as well as communication science suggest spontaneous analogical infer-
enceswithmetaphors occur in problem-solving (Thibodeau&Boroditsky, 2011, 2013, 2015)
under conditions characteristic of much philosophical thought: high level of abstraction
(Keefer et al., 2014), greater psychological distance (Jia & Smith, 2013), low confidence in
own TD understanding (Landau et al., 2014), and low level of TD knowledge (Vandeleene
et al., 2017).
Wedistinguishedwide fromnarrowconceptualmetaphors (Section 2) andhypothesised
that while analogical reasoning involved in metaphor interpretation, as a default, employs
narrow conceptual metaphors (pace standard conceptual metaphor theory), thinkers typ-
ically employ wide conceptual metaphors or correlation-maximising mapping strategies
when deploying analogies for problem-solving (“differential processing hypothesis”). We
provided initial support for the more novel first part of the hypothesis through analysis of
metaphorical “mind-talk” and will now apply the less controversial second part to the anal-
ysis of classical philosophical efforts to solve the problem, or answer the question, “What
happens when we think?” These analyses will jointly expose two fallacies in analogical
reasoning with metaphors that are at the root of introspective conceptions of the mind.
According to our differential processing hypothesis, analogical reasoning in response to
sucha task employs the full CWSGprocedure (Section2) and fuller source–targetmappings.
Influential texts from early modern philosophy of mind couch discussion of the operations
of thought in visual terms and explicitly compare “themind” to a “closet” or enclosed space
in which “pictures” are viewed (e.g. Locke, 1700/1975, II.xi.17, cp. II.iii.1); that is, the mind is
compared to a restricted visual field, and “the understanding” to “the eye” (op. cit. I.i.1), the
organ of sight.20 When deployed in analogical reasoning, these comparisons translate into
the two mappings:
MappingM: visual field ↔ mind
Mapping N: eyes ↔ understanding
These mappings evidently cannot be obtained with our analogy-minimising mapping
strategy, by applying generic mapping adjuncts to core mappings of vision cognition
metaphors like (1) S sees X↔ S knowswhat X is, or (2) S looks at X↔ S thinks about X. They
are, however, generatedwhen the analogy-maximisingmapping strategy of SMT is applied
to generate vision cognition mappings from truisms about the visual SD, given common-
sense background knowledge about the intellectual TD. SMT (cp. Section 2) stipulates that
in analogical reasoning, with or withoutmetaphor, we routinely add newmappings, where
(i) some relations have already been mapped, (ii) the requirement of Parallel Connectivity
demands that wemap their relata, and (iii) the TD contains suitably related elements (Gen-
tner & Markman, 1997, 2005). This general mapping rule leads to mapping N, in inferences
from SD truisms such as:
When we look at something, we use our eyes.
When we see something, we use our eyes.
The first verb in each sentence is mapped by core mappings (1) and (2) of different vision
cognitionmetaphors (Section 2). The next verb, “x uses y”, stands for a generic relation that
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obtains in both the visual SD and the intellectual TD. In SMT, this relation is hence immedi-
ately mapped onto itself (Forbus et al., 1995). This leaves us looking for an element of the
intellectual TD that corresponds to our eyes. The latter are introduced here as a relatum of
the use-relation, temporally linked to the looking-at or seeing-relations that get mapped
onto thinking-about and knowing, respectively. The requirement of parallel connectivity
hence has us look for something we use when we think or get to know things. Since we
then use our wits, reason, intellect, or understanding – different labels for the same faculty
(OED) – we thus obtain Mapping N: eyes ↔ understanding. Those who first think of “the
mind” as “what we use when we think” will instead correlate “the eyes” with “the mind” –
and move to N only in reasoning that correlates “the mind” with something else, so that
SMT’s 1-to-1 mapping constraint obliges them to find another mate for our visual organ.21
Themost salient alternativemapping isMappingM. I submit thismapping is grounded in
a conception of “themind”whichwe elaborate in reasoningwith the conceptualmetaphor
BEING THOUGHT OF AS BEING IN A PERSONAL SPACE, namely, in the reasoning that moti-
vates the prominent expressions “to keep in mind” and “to bear in mind”. In interpreting
these expressions, we conceptualise “the mind” as a storage space of things we can make
use of in thinking, the things we can remember, and thus know (Section 5). We then obtain
mapping M when we align an explanation (or informative representation) of this concept
with a basic explanation (or informative representation) of “visual field”:
(1) The visual field is the space in which the things are that the subject sees.
(2) The mind is the space in which the things are that the subject knows.
TheSMTmapping strategy tells us to immediately correlate the concepts that apparently
recur in both (1) and (2): the “is” of identity, “space”, “X is in Y”, “subject”, etc. In reason-
ing with the conceptual metaphor KNOWING AS SEEING, we will also correlate “seeing”
and “knowing”, as per its core mapping. On this basis, mapping M, like N, is obtained by
enforcing Parallel Connectivity. This requirement has us correlate the relata of the relevant
relations: the objects of sight (the things the subject sees) with the objects of knowledge
(the things the subject knows) – and the visual field (the space in which the objects of sight
are located) with the mind (the space in which the objects of knowledge are located).22
Once the analogy-maximising strategy has put the new mappings M and N into place,
the introspective conception of the mind is just a few analogical inferences away. Its intu-
itive key tenets can be obtained through “full-blooded” analogical (CWSG) inferences with
vision cognition metaphors when – and only when – the narrow conceptual metaphors
KNOWINGASSEEINGandTHINKING-ABOUTAS LOOKING-AT (Section 2) are complemented
with the mappings M and N which analogy-maximising mapping strategies deliver. Rele-
vant CWSG inferences then proceed from SD truisms like “When we look at things, things
are before our eyes” (cp. Fischer, 2014, 2015), as in Table 2.
Table 2. A CWSG inference with transcendent mapping.
SD premise Operation TD conclusion
1 S looks at X Substitution: core mapping (2)
(Looking at↔ Thinking about)
S thinks about X
2 (1) Implies (3–4) Substitution: identical (1) Implies (3–4)
3 X before Y Generation23 X before Y
4 Y = eyes(S) Substitution: mapping N Y = understanding(S)
230 E. FISCHER
From trivially true premises (P1–P4), we thus obtain substantive conclusions (C1–C4)
(non-identical substitutions underlined, generated elements in italics):
P1 When we look at things, things are before our eyes.
C1 When we think about things, things are before our understanding.
P2 When we look at things, things are in our visual field.
C2 When we think about things, things are in our mind.
P3 Things before our eyes are in our visual field.
C3 Things before our understanding are in our mind.
P4 When we look at things, we perceive things with our eyes, in our visual field.
C4 When we think about things, we perceive24 things with our understanding, in our
mind.
These intuitions apparently generate the spatial relations “X is before Y” and “X is in Y” in
the TD and radically transform the notions of “mind” and “understanding”. When used on
their own (rather than as part of complex expressions) in ordinary discourse, these words
are primarily used to refer to intellectual powers or faculties (with further metonymical
uses derivative from this primary use), namely, to “a person’s cognitive, rational, or intel-
lectual powers [!]” (OED, sense 21 of “mind”) and her “faculty [!] of comprehending and
reasoning”, aka “intellect” (OED, sense 1 of “the understanding”). The same holds true of
philosophical discourse, where introspective conceptions replaced Scholastic, ultimately
Aristotelian conceptions of “souls” or “psyches” as collections of powers and faculties (e.g.
“rational psyche” as powers of reasoning and volition, or “sensitive psyche” as set of pow-
ers of perception, locomotion, and a-rational desire) (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, pp. 12–19).
The present analogical reasoning reconceptualises what were previously sets of faculties
(which cannot be meaningfully said to stand in any spatial relations) into a perceptual
space and an organ of sense that peers into that space (both of which participate in spatial
relations).
Crucially, only the new mappings N and M take us through vision cognition metaphors
to these intuitions and an introspective conception of the mind. To see this, consider what
conclusions we obtain through analogical inferences from the present premises (P1–P4)
when we do not employ the new fare but make do with the narrow conceptual metaphors
(1) KNOWING AS SEEING and (2) THINKING-ABOUT AS LOOKING-AT. We then get different
conclusions which do not generate any spatial relations in the TD:
C1* When we think about things, things are before our eyes.
C2* When we think about things, things are within our visual field (ken).
C3* Things before our eyes are in our visual field. (= P3, for want of suitable mappings)
C4* When we think about things, we perceive things with our eyes, in our visual
field.
The remaining visual expressions “before our eyes” and “in our visual field (within our
ken)” have default metaphorical interpretations with vision cognitionmetaphors. These do
not even faintly suggest reference to any organ or space of perception. For “before our
eyes”, we can derive with MAT and KNOWING AS SEEING:
(SI) When something X is before S’s eyes then
(SC) S can easily see X.
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This stereotypical inference furnishes the premise for an analogical inference with a map-
pingweobtain from coremapping (1) with (ABLE) and (MAN)which leads to the conclusion
that S can easily get to know or understand X (cp. interpretation of “clear” in Section 3). The
derivation for “within the visual field/ken” is even simpler:
(SI) When something X is within the ken of S,
(SC) S can see X.
This stereotypical inference furnishes the premise for an analogical inference – similar to
that for “X is beyondmyken” (Section 3) – that delivers the interpretation “S canunderstand
X.” We thus get these metaphorical interpretations:
When we think about things, we can easily understand things.
When we think about things, we can understand things.
When things are easy to understand, we can understand things.
When we think about things, we get to know various things.25
To sum up: analogical reasoning with vision cognition metaphors only gets us from SD
truisms (like P1 to P4) to the conclusions (C1 to C4) constitutive of the introspective concep-
tion of the mind, if we make use of the further mappings M and N which are not part of
those narrow conceptual metaphors. If we eschew these further mappings and apply our
default analogy-minimising interpretation strategy, we obtain no conclusions that would
even faintly suggest the conception of an inner organ and space of perception involved in
thought.
7. Two fallacies
We have reconstructed the analogical reasoning involved in interpreting ordinary
metaphorical talk of “minds” (Section 5) and in generating introspective philosophical
conceptions of the mind (Section 6), respectively. Their comparative analysis allows us to
expose seductive fallacies in the philosophical reasoning reconstructed. Analogical reason-
ing is governed by openly heuristic rules. Whereas normative rules determine or constrain
what is correct, right or reasonable, heuristics are rules of thumb which yield reasonably
accurate judgments in most relevant contexts, without constraining what is to count as
correct. Such rules are never guaranteed to preserve truth. In talk about heuristic reason-
ing, the label “fallacy” therefore tends to be reserved for cases where application of the
relevant rules predictably leads from true premises or accurate information to conclusions
or intuitive judgments that violate normative rules – think, for example, of the “conjunction
fallacy” which arises from the use of the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman,
1983).
The normative rules most frequently referred to in the heuristics literature (reviews:
Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Kahneman, 2011) are rules of logic and probability
theory, whose violation results in judgments that cannot be true (together) or reasonable
to accept. However, normative rules also include syntactic and semantic rules of language,
whose violation results in “nonsense” or conclusions which lack determinate meaning. I
therefore propose to extend the notion of “fallacy” to caseswhere heuristic rules predictably
lead to conclusions that are semantically deficient by lacking not (just) truth but determinate
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meaning. Indeed, as long as this deficiency can be predicted by study of the heuristic
rules at issue, I want to say we are dealing with a “fallacy”, regardless of whether or not
the deficiency is due to violations of normative rules. We will now identify two fallacies
in this slightly more comprehensive sense. These fallacies, one general, the other specific,
both frequently made in abstract reflection, occur in analogical reasoning with conceptual
metaphors, namely, at the stage of mapping.
Let us first build up towards the general fallacy. It arises from the fact that, in analog-
ical reasoning with conceptual metaphors, analogy-maximising mapping strategies (like
SMT) used in problem-solving may have us make mappings that lead to conclusions
which we cannot interpret with the analogy-minimising strategies we ordinarily employ
in metaphor interpretation. Where the default reasoning strategy for analogical problem-
solving employs conceptual metaphors and leads to conclusions we cannot interpret with
the default strategy for metaphor interpretation, we are liable to be left with a claim
whose meaning escapes us. Barring fortuitous semantic rescue, these conclusions lack
determinate meaning.
The above conclusions C1 to C4 illustrate this point. In contrast with their starred coun-
terparts, we cannot use the default interpretation strategy to derive metaphorical inter-
pretations for them, with the vision cognition metaphors used to derive them: C1 to C4
employ at least one of two phrases we obtain when applying Mappings N and M to SD
truisms: “before our understanding” and “in our mind”. In contrast with the SD expression
“x is before our eyes” from which it is obtained, “x is before our understanding” has no
stereotypical or semantic implications in the visual SD. Hence, there is nothing for vision
cognition metaphors to map, and our default interpretation strategy of making restricted
analogical inferences with narrow conceptual metaphors, from SD implications, gets no
grip. Similarly, “in my mind”, in contrast to, say, “within my ken”, has no stereotypical
or semantic implications in the SD of vision that could furnish a premise for subsequent
analogical inference with a narrow vision cognition metaphor. The two key phrases lack
default metaphorical interpretations with the vision cognition metaphors used to derive
the relevant conclusions.
They also lack literal interpretations. In literal talk about the intellectual TD, both “the
understanding” and “themind” ordinarily refer to faculties or powers of reasoning. Faculties
and powers cannot be literally placed in spatial relations (like the generated relations “x is
before y” and “x is in y”). Hence neither “before our understanding” nor “in our mind” can
be interpreted literally, in TD talk. Since C1 to C4 all use at least one of the phrases “before
the understanding” and “in the mind”, these conclusions lack both a literal interpretation
and a default metaphorical interpretation with the conceptual metaphors used to derive
them.
Other conceptual metaphors, or metonymies, may come to the semantic rescue: for
example, the core mapping (I) of the spatial memory metaphor (Section 5) lets us inter-
pret the phrase “in themind”, and this provides a readily intelligible interpretation for some
conclusions (e.g. “When we think about things, we think of things” for C2), if not for oth-
ers (e.g. “Things before our understanding are thought of by us” for C3). Similarly, spatial
time metaphors (Gentner et al., 2002) may suggest to us a temporal interpretation for the
phrase “before the understanding”, as “prior to the act of understanding”,26 which may
yield intelligible interpretations for some conclusions (though perhaps not C1–C4).27 In the
absence of such fortunate coincidences (and prior to ingeniously noticing and exploiting
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them), thinkers are unable to give determinate meaning and content to conclusions like
C1 to C4. Early modern philosophical texts provide evidence for this inability in the shape
of explanations of meaning which either remain purely negative or get disregarded almost
the moment they have been given (see Fischer, 2011, pp. 35–41).
The resulting lack of determinate meaning may be obscured by subjective plausibility.
C1 to C4 have us posit higher-order relations between mapped and generated relations:
(C1) Whenwe think about X, it is before our understanding.
(C2) When we think about X, it is in our mind.
(C3) When X is before the understanding, it is in the mind.
(C4) When an object of thought X is perceived with the understanding, it is before the under-
standing and in the mind.
Deeply integrated mappings endow analogical conclusions with high subjective plau-
sibility (Gentner, Ratterman, & Forbus, 1993; Lassaline, 1996). Furthermore, the posited
framework of higher-order relations facilitates inferences from and to constituent and
related claims, despite their lack of determinate meaning. For example, if something “is
before our understanding” (whatever that might mean exactly), it “is in our mind” (what-
ever that might mean here), and “we perceive it there with our understanding”. Thinkers
may thus be subject to illusions of sense. Since they can make various inferences from and
to sentences employing thesephrases, theymay think that thesehave adeterminatemean-
ing, and that they know it, even though they cannot satisfactorily explain the meaning, or
apply the phrases consistently to concrete situations.
Inour examples, the lackofdeterminatemeaning is due to the simultaneoususeof vision
cognition metaphors and mappings M and N, which do not belong to the narrow concep-
tual metaphors employed in interpreting such metaphorical talk. These further mappings
are pernicious insofar as they have us make substitutions within complex expressions (like
“before S’s eyes’ or “within S’s ken”) that, as a whole, have stereotypical or semantic impli-
cations in the SD (e.g. “It is possible for S to see x”) that are mapped onto the TD (“It is
possible for S to understand x”) by a mapping that forms part of narrow vision cognition
metaphors.MandN,however, haveus, for example, replace “ken”or “visual field”by “mind”,
and “eyes” by “understanding”. These substitutions deprive the overall expression E (say, “x
is within the ken of S”) of the SD implications that facilitate its default metaphorical inter-
pretation with vision cognition metaphors. They thus make E’s default interpretation with
these conceptualmetaphors impossible. In this sense, thosemappings are inconsistentwith
thedefaultmetaphorical interpretationof Ewith particular conceptualmetaphors CM (“default
CM-interpretation”).
Once metaphorical uses have become familiar or conventional, their interpretation
no longer requires analogical inference (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). The present inconsis-
tency hence does not prevent the philosophers at issue from correctly interpreting familiar
metaphorical uses of, say, “beyond my ken” or any other expression E with a conven-
tionalised metaphorical use. The problem may rather arise when our default strategy for
analogical reasoning in problem-solving is used in reasoning from SD premises which
employ a complex expression E that has a default CM-interpretation. When we then make
simultaneous use of the conceptual metaphor CM and mappings inconsistent with the
default CM-interpretation of E, wewill obtain a fresh conclusion that cannot be interpreted
in linewithourdefault interpretation strategy. That is, our fresh conclusionwill lack adefault
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metaphorical interpretation. By forcing substitutions in the complex expression E, those
mappings will simultaneously force generation of relations from the remaining frame, in
our case the spatial relations “x is before y” and “x is in y”. Where such concrete relations are
generated in otherwise more abstract talk (like here), literal interpretation of the resulting
conclusions is likely to involve category mistakes precluding it (“idea spatially before the
understanding”, etc.). Failing “accidental” semantic rescue, such a fresh conclusion will lack
determinate meaning.
We have thus built up to a quite general and potentially hard-to-spot fallacy that may
be committed at the mapping stage of analogical reasoning. Let us call it the “metaphor-
overextension fallacy”. It consists in extending a narrow conceptual metaphor CM (such
as, for example, KNOWING AS SEEING) by adding mappings inconsistent with default CM-
interpretations (like mappings M and N). The rules of “full-blooded” analogical (CWSG)
inference are then liable to takeus from truepremises to semantically deficient conclusions.
Absent semantic rescue through other conceptual metaphors (or fortuitous metonymy,
etc.), they will lead to such conclusions whenever CWSG inferences simultaneously employ
a narrow conceptualmetaphor CMandmappings that are inconsistentwith the CM-default
interpretation of a complex expression employed in the premises.
The second fallacy exposed by our above reconstructions is more specific. It consists in
a mis-mapping of the concept of “the mind”, in analogical reasoning from visual SDs. In
its primary application in the intellectual TD, “the mind” stands for our power of thought
(OED: “a person’s cognitive, rational, or intellectual powers”), that is, the reasoning faculty
that allows us to get to know and understand things. In reasoningwith the core correspon-
dence (1) of “seeing” with “knowing”, we ought to correlate this faculty, as a default, with
the faculty that allows us to get to see things, namely, our sight (OED sense 8a: “the faculty
or power of seeing, as naturally inherent in the eye”):
sight ↔ mind
Within our minimal analogy approach, we obtain this mapping by applying a generic
mapping adjunct to core mapping (1) seeing↔ knowing, namely, a power-adjunct
WHERE V CORRESPONDS TO V*
THERE power to V-y CORRESPONDS TO power to V*-y.
For the case of relations (to which we restricted attention in this paper):
(POWER) IF a relation Rxy in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
a relation R*xy in the TD
THEN the power of x to stand in R to y in the SD
CORRESPONDS TO
the power of x to stand in R*-to y in the TD.
Instead, however, proponents of the introspective conception of the mind correlate the
visual field with the personal space in which we keep things we when think of them
(Section 6). This correlation has a fundamental, if perhaps well-hidden defect. It is no rel-
evant source–target mapping; it fails to correlate an element of the visual SD with an
element of the intellectual TD. For recall (from the end of Section 5) that in interpreting
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spatial cognition metaphors, we use “the mind” exclusively to stand for an element of
these metaphors’ SD, namely, the personal space that the pretence scenario assigns to
subjects. So the correlation of visual fields with minds correlates an element of the SD of
vision cognition metaphors with an element of the source [!] domain of another concep-
tual metaphor, namely, the spatial cognition metaphor BEING THOUGHT OF AS BEING IN
A PERSONAL SPACE. And while of course one conceptual metaphor’s SD may, in princi-
ple, be another’s TD, this is not the case here. All the conceptual metaphors at issue now
have abstract TDs comprising related intellectual activities andachievements, and themap-
ping of visual fields to mind-spaces is from one concrete SD to another concrete SD which
does not overlap with any of the intellectual TDs. So some sort of mistakemust be involved
in the particular SMT-style mapping operations that delivered this supposed SD–TD
mapping.
To identify thismistake, consider again the representations fromwhich themappingwas
obtained (in Section 6), to repeat (for the reader’s convenience):
(1) The visual field is the space in which the things are that the subject sees.
(2) The mind is the space in which the things are that the subject knows.
Knowledge representations may employ terms either literally or metaphorically. However,
whereweemploy termsmetaphorically in the representationof knowledge about the TDof
a relevant conceptualmetaphor,wemaynot simply assume that all the concepts employed
by the representation stand for elements of the TD. Instead, we need to explicitly mark all
metaphorical uses. Without further ado, wemay then assign to the TD only those concepts
that fall outside the scopeofmetaphorical use.Which elements of the TDare invokedby the
metaphorically used expressions is something we need to make explicit by deriving their
metaphorical interpretations. Only the concepts figuring in these interpretations can then
be added to the TD stock.
Our representation (2) mixes literal with metaphorical uses of expressions: “subject”
and “knows” are employed literally. But the phrase “the space in which things are” is used
metaphorically. We want to say that the mind is “the space in which things are” when they
are “kept in mind”; the “space” at issue is the “mind” in which they are then “kept”. The for-
mer clearly is a SI about the SD of the spatial cognition metaphor we use to interpret “S
keeps X inmind.” When things are literally kept in a space or place, they are in that space or
at that place. Conclusions of such reasoning may only be transferred to the TD upon ana-
logical inference (Section 3). For applications in the TD, they hence have to be interpreted
metaphorically, rather than literally. The talk in (2) of a “space in which things are” is hence
metaphorical. Marked accordingly, (2) becomes
(2′) The mind =def.: what, metaphorically speaking, we refer to as the space in which the
things are that, literally speaking, the subject can know (viz. remember, when, metaphorically
speaking, she keeps them in mind).
According to MAT (and ATT-Meta), metaphorically used expressions are to be interpreted
byplacing them into the “pretence cocoon”,where theyare interpretedas true claimsabout
the SD (not the TD!) of the relevant conceptual metaphor and further inferences are drawn.
Their conclusions can then serve as premises of analogical inferenceswhich use a restricted
range ofmappings; only the conclusions of such analogical inferences are then literally true
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of the TD and refer exclusively to elements of the TD (Section 3). The relevant inferences
(Section 5) use the mapping (I) of the spatial relation “X is in the personal space (mind) of S
↔ S thinks of X’ but do not map “the mind” itself on anything. These analogical inferences
thus lead to conclusions that no longer refer to “the mind”. We hence cannot assign the
“mind-space” of (2) to the TD, at any point of the interpretation process.
When we do so, nonetheless, this is arguably because we fail to distinguish between
literal and metaphorical use of terms in the representation of TD knowledge from which
we start out. Thus, we obtained mapping M above (Section 6) by treating “the space in
which the things are”, in (2), as literally invoking a “space” and the spatial relation “X is in
Y” (which they do when, and only when, the metaphorically used expressions are placed
in the pretence cocoon for further derivation of mappable SD conclusions) and thereby
referring to TD elements (which they do not, at any point, as they do not get correlatedwith
any TD element – only “X is in the space of S” but not “X is in Y” get mapped in metaphor
interpretation).
The two mapping fallacies we have identified illustrate two ways in which metaphori-
cal expressions can come to be interpreted overly literally. We may either overextend the
underlying conceptual metaphor by adding to it mappings that are inconsistent with it,
in the sense explained, and thus prevent default metaphorical interpretation. Or we may
import elements of a conceptual metaphor’s concrete SD into an abstract TD. The for-
mer may happen as a result of analogy-maximising mapping strategies which we employ
in problem-solving but not in metaphor interpretation. The latter may result from such
strategieswhenwe fail to distinguish between literal andmetaphorical uses of terms in rep-
resentations of TD knowledge that are employed in alignment andmapping. Both fallacies
occur in the derivation of the central tenets of introspective conceptions of the mind.
8. Conclusion and future research
Wehave thusobtained theoutlineof adebunkingexplanationofhow thosephilosophically
and culturally influential conceptions are obtained. By exposing fallacies in the inferences
withwhich their central tenets are inferred, while letting us understandwhywemake them
anyway, this explanation can help us resolve classical philosophical paradoxes which pre-
suppose introspective conceptions of the mind, such as, for example, “arguments from
illusion” and “from hallucination” (Crane & French, 2015; Fischer, Engelhardt, & Herbelot,
2015; Smith, 2002). They also let us resolve paradoxes which arise from the clash of intro-
spective conceptions with recent findings from social psychology (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows,
1996; Wilson, 2002) and cognitive psychology (Gigerenzer et al., 2011; Kahneman, 2011),
which suggest that in the absence of determinate prior attitudes or information, people
typically perform actions, take decisions and form beliefs due to processes of automatic
cognition into which they have little, if any, insight of the sort introspective conceptions of
the mind imply we have.
Further research is required to develop the proposed explanation. First, the new MAT
version of the ATT-Meta approach remains to be computationally implemented by pro-
viding the ATT-Meta model with a comprehensive knowledge base that captures precisely
the kind of world knowledge encoded in stereotypes (as initiated by Veale & Hao, 2008)
and can support rich interpretations of visual and spatial cognition metaphors. A compu-
tational implementation can be used to derive metaphorical interpretations for a wider
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range of expressions. Plausibility ratings for competing interpretations andparaphrase elic-
itation tasks (cp. Glucksberg & Haught, 2006; Rubio-Fernández, Wearing, & Carston, 2015)
can then be used to further examine the hypothesis that MAT (but not, say, SMT) cap-
tures a default strategy formetaphor interpretationby testingpredictions generatedby the
computational model. Plausibility ratings for solutions to problems presented in different
metaphorical and literal frames can then be used to examine the other half of the differ-
ential processing hypothesis and the conditions under which thinkers use linguistically
realised conceptual metaphors for analogical reasoning in problem-solving (Jia & Smith,
2013; Keefer et al., 2014). Case-studies on philosophical texts can finally study the extent to
which potential conclusions of such reasoning are accepted without, and presupposed in
further philosophical argument (cp. Cappelen, 2012; Fischer, 2011), so that our warrant for
maintaining introspective conceptions of the mind is dependent upon what spontaneous
inferences aremade for obtaining their key tenets. According to the proposed explanation,
these inferences are fallacious.
Notes
1. These studies analyse examples from the BerkeleyMasterMetaphor List (Lakoff, 1994) andGoatly
(1997).
2. Throughout, properties or “object-attributes” are here treated as 1-place relations.
3. This focus is sometimesobscuredby the traditional THING1ASTHING2 labelswhich theATT-Meta
literature continues to apply to mappings that actually correlate relations. Thus, for example,
MIND AS PHYSICAL SPACE actually correlates the relations “J is physically located in a physical
region belonging to [person] P” and “[Person] P is able mentally to use [idea] J” (e.g. Barnden,
2016).
4. Throughout, variables x, y, z . . . do not range only over individuals. They can take any fillers of
the subject- and patient-roles of the relevant verbs as values.
5. (MAN) and (EXT) below simplify formulations in the extant literature.
6. Where TA actually amounts to a temporal relation (“before”, “after”, “until”, etc.), a further corre-
spondence is required as input: (T-REL) If R1xy ↔ R1*xy and R2xy ↔ R2*xy, and R1xy stands in
temporal relation T to R2xy, then R1*xy stands in T to R2*xy.
7. Here and throughout this paper,wedeploy theATT-Meta theory and forward-reasoning toobtain
default interpretations for sub-sentential expressions or open sentences. The computational
implementation of the theory (also called “ATT-Meta”) actually employs goal-directed reasoning
and interprets whole sentences.
8. These three verbs jointly account for 85%ofmetaphorical uses of sight terms in a corpus obtained
fromanaturalistic context (verbal lecturer–student interactions) (MacArthur, Krennmayr, & Little-
more, 2015).
9. The likelihood of selection is, however, not merely a function of strength of stereotypical associa-
tion and degree of contextual fit. Whereas the properties appearing in genericmapping adjuncts
are selected as a default, others, like colour, need not be selected even when contextually appro-
priate (“Mary’s pencil is blue but John’s is a tomato”, Wallington, 2010) and seem to be selected
only together with other properties. For example, “emeralds of your face” and “pearls of your
mouth” (Herrero Ruiz, 2003) readily conveys information about both colour and (aesthetic) value
(beautiful green eyes or white teeth). Discussion of contextual and other constraints on property
selection is, however, beyond this paper’s remit.
10. By contrast, the ATT-Meta model, which has been developed not for psychological explanation
but to deliver interpretations for as many metaphorical uses as possible, delivers interpretations
for both attributional and analogical metaphors, and employs analogical inferences also for the
former purpose. See, for example, Wallington (2010).
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11. For a review of related but distinct notions of “default interpretation”, see Jaszczolt (2011). Cp.
Giora, Givoni, and Fein (2015).
12. For example, the schema associatedwith “keep inmind” (see Section 5) corresponds to one sense
of “remember” (MEDAL sense 2a), but not others (e.g.MEDAL sense 1).
13. For discussion of various problems involved in this use of dictionaries, see Steen et al. (2010).
14. This metaphor differs also from the relation-to-relation mapping the extant ATT-Meta literature
proposes to account for similar linguistic data (cp. Note 3). Comparative evaluation of these two
approaches has to be reserved for another occasion.
15. This involves a promissory note insofar as the ATT-Meta literature has not yet provided resources
to handle tense. We simplify by taking past and future tense as temporal attributes projected by
(T-ATT).
16. Even in the most sincere love letter, “I am thinking of you night and day” means that the writer
thinks of the addressee again and again, rather thanwithout interruption. And Imay be “thinking
of travelling to Japan” for months, even when I hardly ever find the time to devote thought to
travel plans.
17. Very similar reasoning lets us derive the conventional metaphorical interpretation for the now
obsolete “to pass from / out of mind”: to be no longer thought of/remembered, to be forgotten
(cp. OED).
18. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english-thesaurus/mind (last accessed12Novem-
ber 2015)
19. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english-thesaurus/mind. Cp. the explanation of
“having someone/thing in mind” as “to be thinking of someone or something” (note
the tense, my italics), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/have-someone/
thing-in-mind (both accessed 12 November 2015)
20. See Fischer (2011, chapters1–3) for a fuller discussion of analogical reasoning in early modern
texts by Boyle, Locke, and Berkeley. For philosophical context, see McDonald (2003).
21. This accounts, I submit, for the fact that many early modern texts use both “the mind” and “the
understanding” to stand for both organ and field/space of inner perception – twodifferent things
(review: Fischer, 2011, pp. 35–40).
22. Spoiler alert: Section 7 will expose fallacies in these mapping operations.
23. The present analysis explores what happens in CWSG inference with narrow vision cognition
metaphors complemented by N and M. Since these narrow conceptual metaphors don’t map
spatial relations, “X is before Y” is left over in the candidate conclusion, and thus generated in the
TD, once all substitutions have been made. Where more comprehensive mappings are used and
representations of TD knowledge are taken to invoke suitable correlates, CWSG inferences use
substitution, instead, to arrive at the same conclusions.
24. Since “perceive” (OED: “to apprehend with the mind or senses”) stands for an epistemic rela-
tion that can obtain in both the SD of seeing and the TD of cognition, it gets mapped onto, and
substituted by, itself, in analogy-maximising reasoning with SMT-style mapping.
25. This interpretation involves SD inference from “we perceive things with our eyes” to “we see
things”, followed by analogical inference with core mapping seeing ↔ knowing. “in the visual
field” is ignored as redundant. (Where else would we see things?)
26. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
27. For example, for C1 a referee suggested the reading “We think about things prior to under-
standing them.” However, while this claim is intelligible, its derivation requires interpreting
“understanding” as standing for a relation, namely, between subjects and objects of thought.
Derivation from P1 withmapping N treats the understanding as an entity (object or event), rather
than a relation, even if a spatial-temporal mapping is applied to “X is before Y.” A derivation with
N would therefore not warrant the proposed reading.
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